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reflections on culture, heritage and preservation
Reflections on Culture, 
Heritage and Preservation
Eunice Ribeiro Durham
Since culture is the subject of this seminar1 I would like to begin with a dis-
cussion of the commonsense notion of culture. As CONDEPHAAT is charged 
with formulating cultural policy, it is important to understand commonsense 
meanings of the term in order to be better able to reach the most diverse pub-
lic possible. This is relatively easy to do because commonsense notions of 
culture are part of our own understandings of the concept. Could one of you 
please give me a commonsense definition of culture?
(From the audience): ”For the majority of people culture is somehow intangible and 
far above ordinary things. It includes painting, music, theatre, cinema.”
This is a good definition and contains important points for us to analyze. 
First of all, it reveals that culture has to do with the elite. It is sophisticated 
and therefore requires sophistication to be understood. But this elitist con-
ception of culture contains two dimensions: that of the nature of cultural 
goods themselves, somehow spiritual and elevated; and that of the special 
ability that only a few people have to be able to appreciate them. “To be cul-
tured”, according to commonsense views, means having a certain amount of 
knowledge and information that aren’t necessary for day to day life and also 
having a special ability to appreciate culture and to make use of it. In addi-
tion, culture so defined tends to be highly valued, not only by intellectuals 
but people in general, who show respect and admiration for people consid-
ered cultured, even if this attitude may contain some degree of ambiguity. 
Those who research in working class areas know about this. The fact that 
1 Lecture followed by a debate held in July 1983 during the seminar Culture, heritage and preservation, 
organized by technical staff from CONDEPHAAT (Historic, Artistic and Tourist Heritage Defence Council) 
of São Paulo State. The sound recording was transcribed by Mada Penteado, revised by the author and 
published in Arantes, 1984.
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most people see researchers as highly educated and cultured means that they 
are treated with a certain respect but also possibly with a degree of suspicion 
or even hostility as if they were unable to understand the problems of ordi-
nary people. Even so, the idea that the social world is split between “those 
who know” and “those who don’t know”, those who “are cultured” and “those 
who are not” is an idea shared by all.
(From the audience) – “Do you mean to say that the Secretariat for Culture operates 
on the basis of this meaning of culture?”
I believe so. Apart from anything else, the Secretariat is composed of people 
who “are cultured”, who tend to think that they alone are able to define what 
culture is. In the case of CONDEPHAT, this means deciding what should be 
included as a part of cultural heritage and what should not. 
Coming back to the basic understandings of the concept of culture, we 
can conclude that it covers diverse aspects. In the first place, the idea that 
culture is valued and should be preserved establishes a bridge between the 
interests of CONDEPHAT and those of the people as a whole who give legit-
imacy to preservationist policies. Secondly, it is important to recognize the 
multiple referents of the concept of culture, including objects, knowledge 
and abilities. This second aspect is important because it formed the basis 
for the way anthropology came to reformulate the term, creating an entirely 
new concept. The fundamental shift consisted of “de-elitizing” the notion 
of culture, removing the idea that culture consists of special and superior 
knowledge produced by certain people of a particular social class. All of the 
commonsense meanings of culture were maintained but they were extended 
to include the entirety of human production and all social behavior.
The commonsense notion of culture recognizes that certain goods are 
considered superior and of great symbolic complexity. The anthropological 
concept of culture starts from the premise that such qualities impregnate all 
human behavior: in the ceremonial of official receptions as much as in the 
relations between workers and their bosses; in the painting of a picture as 
much as the cooking of a cake; in the understanding of a book on geography 
as much as the ability to move around a city.
By classifying all behavior as culture, anthropology presupposes a dis-
tinction between nature and culture. The basic idea of the anthropological 
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concept of culture is that human beings as very special animals, whose spec-
ificity lies in the fact that most of their behavior is not genetically transmit-
ted. Thus, collective social action is organized through symbolic systems. In 
this way specific forms of adaptation come into being, producing knowledge 
and regular patterns of behavior that are learned, transmitted and also trans-
formed from generation to generation.
All human behavior is in this sense “artifical” and not “natural”. Human be-
ings are animals who build artificial environments through the development 
of symbolic systems, in which they live. Culture, then, is the creation, trans-
mission, reformulation and transformation of these artificial environments. 
There is something very democratic about the anthropological notion of 
culture, based as it is on the recognition of the immense creativity and the 
abilities of all human beings. This can be seen clearly through a considera-
tion of language. Languages are an extremely rich and complex cultural crea-
tion. Almost all humans learn to speak and are, therefore, “cultured”. Anyone 
who is able to learn something as complex as language is fully able to manip-
ulate symbolic systems and thus participate in any cultural activity. 
Recognizing the importance of the symbolic dimension of human behav-
ior allows us to reposition certain aspects that we found in the commonsense 
notion of culture. One of them points to the products of human activity, in 
particular the production of material goods: paintings; monuments; objects. 
But one must also take into account specifically symbolic production that 
involves the manipulation of language: literary works; scientific theories; 
religious systems; judicial codes. The notion of symbolic production is funda-
mental because it allows us to focus on the central problem of the concept of 
culture: the question of meaning.
Seen from the perspective of meaning, the distinction between materi-
al and symbolic production disappears. It is easy to see how material goods 
carry symbolic meanings and that it is the wealth or importance of these 
symbolic meanings that characterize those goods defined as culture under 
the commonsense definition of the term. A work of art, and by extension any 
material product, is simultaneously the matter out of which it is made and 
the meaning it crystallizes and expresses. 
But there is another aspect of the concept of culture which I could like to 
discuss. The commonsense definition of culture covers not only goods, but 
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also the human ability to make them and to enjoy them. When we say that 
someone is cultured, we mean to say that he or she is well informed and that 
he or she is able to enjoy cultural goods. 
A cultured person is someone who goes to a concert and feels pleasure 
when he or she hears a symphony. So the concept of culture is not passive. 
It includes not only cultural goods but also the actions surrounding them. 
Since its inception, Anthropology has been concerned with the dynamic as-
pect of culture through the study of custom.
The concept of custom is slightly different from the concept of a sym-
bolic good, because we are not talking about the product of human action, 
but the very nature of such action; a standardized action that is organized 
through rules which are symbolically coded and thus, as is the case of cultur-
al goods, bearers of meaning.
This is the dimension of culture, which, I would argue, is fundamental. It 
implies a definition that is based on the regularity and meaning of behavior 
that have resulted from the manipulation of symbolic systems.
If we think of culture in this way it is possible to compare it to the notion 
of work in Marxian theory. When Marx refers to work he is thinking of ma-
terial production. But by analogy we can think of symbolic production. One 
important aspect of work is its cumulative nature: through work, men not 
only establish a relationship with nature, extracting from her useful goods 
that may be immediately consumed, but they also produce tools, knowledge 
and techniques (acquired bodily abilities) that constitute the means of pro-
duction. Culture is like this. Once it has been created it establishes the basis 
for future creativity. But there is another important factor in the notion of 
work and, particularly that of means of production, namely that any good 
contains dead work that may be brought to life by further work. For example, 
a pen is the product of work. If it is kept in a drawer this work is effectively 
dead. But if the pen is then used to write an article through this additional 
work it becomes an instrument of production.
We can think of culture and symbolic production in a similar way. 
Symbolic products also possess a certain concreteness. But if they are not 
used, the work that brought them into being is in a sense dead. This is the 
case of an article that was never published nor read by anyone. But once pub-
lished, read, discussed and contested through additional “cultural work”, 
it becomes an integral part of culture. The basic idea I am trying to impart 
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is that culture is not so much goods themselves, but their utilization. We 
should think of culture as a process through which human beings are obliged 
constantly to produce and utilize cultural goods in order to be able to act in 
society. This is the only way that collective life can be organized.
Mendel’s theory of heredity is a good example of what I am trying to say. 
As we all know, Mendel’s theory was ignored for a long time. It was in a way 
dead. It existed. It had been written. But in effect it was dead because no one 
knew about it or used it. When it was rediscovered and people began to un-
dertake genetic experiments and to interpret the world in terms of the theo-
ry, it became alive as a part of culture, a tool for men to act on the world and 
for them to relate to one another. It may even be understood as a consumer 
good since I am sure that certain people derive pleasure from understanding 
Mendel’s theory even if they do not utilize it in practical terms.
This notion of culture as something that is constantly recreated and 
re-utilized, a basic instrument for all human action provides us with a pow-
erful analytical perspective just so long as it is not employed in an exaggerat-
edly utilitarian mode.
Culture satisfies more than material necessities. Indeed, much of what 
we call culture has no practical utility whatever. In most societies, people 
spend an inordinate amount of time producing things that are economi-
cally useless but which are esthetically satisfying and have the effect of es-
tablishing social relations. Take body painting for example. Among many 
indigenous peoples of Brazil a great amount of time is dedicated to painting 
elaborate designs on faces and bodies. But the adornment survives only two 
baths. There is clearly no practical utility involve. It is however a source of 
esthetic pleasure and a way of bringing about social relations. People ad-
mire one another, sometimes competitively. Painting a son or husband can 
show affection. A particular pattern might indicate the member of a kin 
group or a position in the social hierarchy. Painting bodies may also have 
important ritual significance. All cultures are full to the brim with appar-
ently useless and frivolous activities. Look at our own habit of baking elab-
orate cakes, especially for birthdays and weddings. An enormous amount 
of work is invested in producing cakes that will immediately be consumed. 
Yet it is such activities that are the pleasure of living, exactly because they 
celebrate social relations. It is true that everyone worries a lot about making 
sure they have the basic necessities. Yet whenever possible even these are 
81
vibrant v.10 n.1  eunice ribeiro durham
subject to “superfluous” elaboration.
An example of this is provided by the way the Trobriand islanders stud-
ied by Malinowski deal with their yams at harvest time. You might imagine 
that once the harvest is over the yams are simply stored for future consump-
tion. But that is not what happens. Once they have been harvested, the yams 
are carefully cleaned to the extent that even the filaments are shaved off. 
Then they are arranged in huge pyramids with the largest and most beauti-
ful yams on the outside so they can be easily admired. A shelter is then con-
structed to protect them. After a few days and much admiration, the pyramid 
is broken down and most of the yams are transported with much pomp and 
ceremony to the house of the farmer’s sister’s husband where the pyramid 
is rebuilt to receive more admiring visitors. Finally the yams are stocked in 
large granaries, which surround the central patio of the village. They are 
elaborately constructed out of trellised wood with the largest and most beau-
tiful yams on the outside. Thus, food is produced not only to satisfy hunger 
but also to mark out social relations and to provide esthetic pleasure. 
We are not so different. In our own society the exhibition of large quan-
tities of highly elaborate foods constitutes the very soul of our celebrations. 
So it is clear that we cannot understand culture in utilitarian terms. Even 
the most useful of material goods are immersed in a dense web of social re-
lations, esthetic elaborations and ritual forms from which so much satisfac-
tion is derived. 
Returning to the notion of culture as signifying action that relies on the 
manipulation of symbolic tools, we can now try to apply it to the notion of 
cultural heritage. To do this, we must define heritage in terms of the meaning 
that it has for the population at large, on the understanding that the meaning 
of a cultural good depends on the way in which it is used in society. We should 
understand cultural heritage as a series of crystallizations of “dead workers”, 
that has become important again with an investment of “cultural work”, 
through which the good in question acquires new uses and new meanings. 
Indeed, one of the characteristics of this process of cultural construction lies 
in the fact that the greater the symbolic charge conferred on the past of a cul-
tural good, the greater the possibility of its future use. So we can agree that 
there are certain special goods that deserve a special effort to preserve them 
for future generations because of the meanings they have acquired. 
While it is relatively easy to discuss all this in general terms, the problem 
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becomes more complex when we turn to the constitution of heritage in our 
own society. Here we must return to the discussion at the beginning of this 
talk, namely the elitist nature of the concept of cultural heritage under the 
commonsense definition of culture. When working with primitive socie-
ties this problem ceases to exist since they tend to be relatively homoge-
neous and egalitarian—all members of the society know the same things, 
use the same techniques and have equal access to the material and spiritual 
resources of the culture, which is thus a collective heritage available to all. 
In a differentiated society such as our own, the question must be asked in a 
different way. The culture, which is produced by society as a whole, is still 
a collective heritage. Yet distinct groups and social classes do not have the 
same access to this heritage, just as these diverse segments of society con-
tribute in their own specific way to this heritage. To a certain extent this 
is inevitable since the social division of labor has led to such a wealth and 
complexity of cultural production that no one individual is able to cover it 
alone. In a differentiated society, different forms of work, regional and eth-
nic differences, together with various historical traditions contribute to an 
increase in heterogeneity. In the very process of nation building, groups and 
classes appropriate specific cultural elements that are frequently used to 
differentiate one group or class from another. Such cultural differences are 
often highly valued by the groups concerned and lead to the development of 
specific moral and esthetic patterns. 
It would however be disingenuous to suggest that these phenomena are 
fully reciprocal. The fact that social relations are permeated by power means 
that certain groups manage to impose their tastes, deciding what is good for 
the others or, inversely, restricting the access of dominated groups to high-
ly prized cultural goods. In effect, the dominant classes direct material and 
cultural production, which they then have the privilege of appropriating for 
themselves. 
This means that dominant groups in society have access to cultural 
goods that are different, but also often better and more elaborate than those 
available to the others. A certain amount of leisure and material resources 
are needed to be able to acquire and use a sophisticated cultural good, above 
all those that are considered superior because of the quality and quantity of 
work that has been invested in their production. The building of a house re-
quiring specialized labor, architects, engineers and a wide range of material 
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resources, is quite different from building a house in a favela. Great cre-
ativity can go into building a house in a favela but the material resources 
will be limited. A considerable amount of creativity and work is required to 
produce a technically adequate solution for a dwelling. This is true for cul-
tural goods as a whole. Owning and appreciating a cultural good requires a 
certain amount of training, the right education, a certain amount of leisure 
time and the necessary material resources. This is why class differences are 
not qualitatively equivalent. The elitist component of the commonsense 
definition of culture contains a grain of truth in the sense that it recognizes 
that dominant classes have the privilege to possess the resources, the time 
and the knowledge necessary to appropriate and appreciate the most elabo-
rate cultural goods. 
Members of the working class lacks thee resources. Often they are 
obliged to produce their own cultural goods with much difficulty and short-
age of resources. As this kind of cultural production is not stored, it can 
rapidly be lost. Thus, working class memory tends to be short because it de-
pends entirely on word of mouth. The history of Brazilian trades unions is 
a case in point. The vast majority of Brazilian workers have not the slightest 
idea of trade union history. Those who do are the intellectuals in the univer-
sities who have the time, resources and training necessary for safeguarding 
it. So what are workers’ chances of recovering the memory of their struggles 
and traditions? This will depend on the word of mouth within the unions 
themselves. They lack the time and training to study trade union history. 
That is why they tend to have access only toe recent data. This is not the 
case of the dominant classes. We work with much greater historical depth. 
We are privileged classes because we are able to produce and utilize cultural 
goods of this nature. 
Looking at things from this point of view enables us to envisage with 
greater clarity the sort of policy on cultural heritage that might be developed 
in a society that aspires to democracy. It is based on the notion that cultur-
al heritage which in effect is produced collectively should be appropriated 
collectively as well. This means that ways must be found to make sure that 
members of all social classes gain access to those elements of cultural herit-
age that are symbolically charged and yet which have until recently been mo-
nopolized by the dominant sectors of society. When I think of cultural policy 
I don’t simply in terms of folklore and the populist celebration of popular 
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culture. Surely we must give value to popular culture, but we must also en-
sure that so-called high culture ceases to be the monopoly and privilege of 
any one class. A collective heritage must be available to all. Bricklayers, tile 
layers, plumbers, etc produce great works of architecture. Yet the dominant 
classes use these buildings investing them with symbolic importance. A 
more democratic conception of cultural and historical heritage would dimin-
ish this kind of class privilege. 
Heritage policy in Brazil has two important aspects. In the first place, 
the history that is preserved tends to be the history of the dominant classes. 
The monuments that are preserved are the ones associated with the historical 
and cultural achievements of these classes. The history of the dominated is 
rarely preserved. Looking again at working class movements, it is easy to see 
that the long history of past political action is not marked by physical objects 
(monuments, museums, exihibitions, commemorations) that would serve to 
keep them alive in people’s minds.
This is not the result of purposeful mystification. Many of these events 
and cultural achievements are not even perceived by the members of the 
dominant classes who control heritage policy and who are led, often uncon-
sciously, to think only of their own history and those symbolic goods closest 
to their own experience. To a certain extent these attitude can be justified 
by the fact that such cultural artifacts are effectively more elaborate, more 
“monumental” than those produced by subaltern segments of society. Yet 
it is true that this process leads to the loss of innumerable cultural goods 
whose importance has not been perceived by the elites. Thus, significant and 
important historical events that are important for understanding society as a 
whole are forgotten. 
Although my presentation of these cultural phenomena is somewhat 
simplified and schematic, my talk aims to draw attention to a few issues that 
seem relevant to those who are interested in formulating new policy for the 
preservation of our historical and cultural heritage. In the first place, I argue 
that we should to give importance to the use of this heritage in such a way 
as to ensure that the “dead work” that has been invested in it can be trans-
formed into new symbolic investments. Secondly, we should democratize 
collective cultural heritage in two ways: by eliminating the material and edu-
cational barriers that exclude the vast majority of the population from gain-
ing access to cultural goods that tend to be monopolized by the dominant 
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segments of society; and by preserving and disseminating the cultural work 
of the working class, making sure that members of this class have access to 
the tools required for this work, for communicating it to society as a whole 
and for transmitting it to future generations.
These are the ideas I wish to put forward. 
Excerpts from the debate
A question from the public: You observed that the cultural goods of the dominant 
classes are more elaborate and require more work to produce. From the point of view 
of anthropology does this mean that they are really better? In addition, is there any 
anthropological criterion for determining which heritage items should be given pri-
ority for preservation?
Eunice – Two difficult questions. The reply to the first is that there arte no 
such criteria. It is possible to evaluate the technological processes involved, 
but even this depends on a plethora of criteria. For example, you could devise 
as criterion the survival and expansion of the group that carries the culture. 
If you did that you would be giving value to the arts of war. You could argue 
then that barbarian culture was superior to Roman culture because it was 
able to destroy it. The history of humanity is full of examples of cultures that 
have disappeared because the groups that developed them were destroyed by 
others. So a truly objective criterion exists. But you may not wish do adopt it 
(as I would not). I would expect more form a culture than its ability to con-
quer others. But this is an objective fact that cannot be denied. For example, 
the technological developments of the Industrial Revolution had the effect 
of eliminating the possibility of the survival of older technologies. This is an 
historical reality. We may not approve of all that came with this revolution, 
but it took place. Lévi-Strauss has argued that this criterion marks two fun-
damental periods of human history. He pointed to two revolutions that led 
to fundamental changes in the way natural resources were appropriated and, 
consequently, in social relations also. The first was the Neolithic Revolution 
that involved the domestication of animals and plants, the development of 
pottery and metal working. The second was the Industrial Revolution. In fact 
we could add a third revolution that Lévi-Strauss does not do. The first revo-
lution was the production of fire, the first industrial revolution, in fact. But 
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the Neolithic Revolution changed the relations between peoples to such an 
extent that those groups that first embraced it gained such an advantage that 
the people who did not adopt agriculture, the herding of animals and other 
Neolithic techniques were relegated to distant and inhospitable regions of 
the earth. They were therefore in a totally disadvantageous position when the 
Industrial Revolution arrived. On the eve of the Industrial Revolution of the 
16th and 17th centuries, these were the hunters and gatherers of Australia, the 
pygmies of the African forests, the San of Southern Africa, and the peoples of 
Patagonia. Groups who had developed in one way or another the techniques 
of the Neolithic Revolution had dominated the rest of the American and 
African continents and all of Asia and Europe. So in a way an objective crite-
rion exists, or rather two: one is the degree of control over nature, the other, 
related, is the possibility of dominating other groups. 
The Industrial Revolution brought about such an enormous transforma-
tion that societies it passed by lost all competitivity. While we must recog-
nize that societies compete with one another, this criterion is relative. We 
cannot deduce that the “winning” culture is better than others. You may say 
that it is more competitive than others. But by other criteria, even techno-
logical prowess, one cannot say that one culture is better than another. In 
Western societies, for example, the technique of working with feathers that 
had been developed in the Inca empire does not exist. Those adornments 
can no longer be made because no one knows how. Even the societies of the 
Amazonian forest have sophisticated techniques for working with feathers 
that we do not. For certain forms of artisan work, techniques do not vary 
along with general development; basketry, for example. The best examples 
of basketry are made by primitive people and not by our own artisans. The 
same is true of pottery. The ceramics produced in the empires of Mexico, the 
Maia, Toltec, Aztec, etc. are simply wonderful. The ceramics of the Assurini, 
a Brazilian Indian society, are also truly wonderful and esthetically highly 
elaborate, even if somewhat limited by the fact that this small group produc-
es them only for utilitarian purposes. This limits variability. 
When turning to symbolic production, ritual for example, there are no 
criteria for excellence. Indeed many anthropologists suspect that the devel-
opment of western civilization had a negative effect on people’s lives. Recent 
calculations show that members of primitive societies worked generally 
for four hours per day, using the remaining hours for flute-playing, rituals 
87
vibrant v.10 n.1  eunice ribeiro durham
and other intense social activities. Exhausting work occupied a relatively 
short amount of time. Even if people died earlier they spent most of their 
time enjoying themselves. On the other hand, it is clear that the Industrial 
Revolution ushered in a daily working day of 16 hours in dangerous filthy en-
vironments. Manufacture was increased but with it a brutal exploitation of 
labor. So, returning to judgments of value, we can say that they exist and yet 
don’t exist. As far as technical goods are concerned, a more objective view is 
possible. You can say with objectivity a pot that is worse than another is the 
one that cracks when put on the fire. It is also possible (with a certain effort 
on account of highly variable patterns) to admire the esthetic refinement of 
certain goods. As Boas wrote, “an artistic good is one that shows a particular 
rhythm allied to excellence in manufacture”. It is possible to judge material 
objects in this way. Among primitive people, where all production is by arti-
sans, these patterns are shared so that there are commonly shared criteria for 
evaluating production. The best work is thus recognized. This is the opposite 
of what happens when such objects become tourist items. This is because 
the tourists, who have no knowledge of native criteria of quality, often prefer 
goods considered by them to be inferior. This leads to the almost inevitable 
deterioration of artisan crafts. 
While one may define certain goods as better or worse, this is not possi-
ble for other ones. What, for example, would be the criterion used to claim 
that a monogamous family is better than a polygenous one or even a polyan-
drous one? None. It just is not possible to compare them, saying that one is 
better adapted, or more natural or whatever. They are different. In this case 
no comparison is possible. That was the first question. I took a long time to 
reply. The second question? …. 
P – I asked if there were criteria for creating priorities for the preservation of materi-
al goods. 
E – Well, I think that here also we have two answers. One reply is to say that it 
depends on the meaning it bears; its historical significance. Some goods that 
are full of meaning. These can easily be re-appropriated and reutilized. They 
are always at the top of the list of heritage items to be preserved. The other 
answer is that it depends on politics. We tend to preserve those things whose 
political significance is greatest. They may be monuments to the achieve-
ments of the dominant classes or the dominated ones. Then there is, I think, 
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a tendency to preserve the greatest variety of cultural products, because so 
much of human creativity is easily lost. In our own society less is lost because 
of our tendency to document everything. I recall again Malinowksi when he 
drew attention to the importance of tradition for the Trobriand islanders. He 
argued that we had to imagine how their elements of tradition had been ob-
tained and preserved with great sacrifice. In the case of an epidemic that kills 
four key members of society, they might not be able to build a canoe again. 
Say there are two specialists who know the sacred myths. Should they die 
without passing them on, this heritage is lost. All that humanity has creat-
ed was in effect was brought into being with great effort and in large part 
with the gross exploitation of many people. The possibility of recovering 
and developing this heritage as something that circulates in cultural action 
must be taken into account in the planning of the institutions responsible 
for cultural policy.
P – How would you relate the preservation of cultural heritage and the nation? 
When was the nation born? 
E - Well, in the modern sense of the term, the Nation-State came into being 
through an act of domination. It was based on the fictive existence of a com-
mon cultural heritage, which is evidently a gross fabrication. A common 
cultural heritage was created through the action of the State. Take the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, for example. What we call 
the United Kingdom resulted from the brutal conquest of the Welsh and the 
Scots who still refuse to see themselves as truly part of Britain; not to men-
tion the Irish. The same is true of France, where, especially after Napoleon, 
regional languages and place names were prohibited in the name of a com-
mon culture. Until quite recently you couldn’t register your child by a Basque 
name. From the point of view of the nation builders, cultural particularities 
are loci for the crystallization of political opposition such as the Walloons in 
Belgium and the French speakers of Canada.
I am not sure whether this was exactly the question you asked. In Brazil 
the same process is very clear. The Portuguese conquerors expropriated and 
destroyed indigenous culture and the very Indians themselves. After this, 
similar efforts were made to eradicate the cultural forms brought by slaves 
from Africa. Slavery is one of the most violent forms of cultural destruction. 
Absolute control was established to impede the reproduction of African 
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culture and to bar slaves from access to the dominant culture. The immense 
black contribution to Brazilian culture is nothing short of a miracle; the mir-
acle of survival in the face of the most hostile circumstances. These are the 
negative aspects of nation building. 
But there are also positive aspects. In general the contact between two 
groups results in cultural enrichment. Most inventions do not occur inde-
pendently in distinct groups; rather they pass from one to another. This ap-
plies to productive techniques, myths, histories, games, hairstyles, bodily 
adornments etc. Human beings are good imitators like their closest kinsfolk, 
apes and monkeys. Contact heightens the imagination. Cultural exchange has 
been continuous throughout the history of humanity. This has two implica-
tions for any nation state: the weakening of specific manifestations due to 
the denial of internal cultural difference; or a strengthening of many diverse 
cultural aspects that are in their turn appropriated by diverse groups. So as 
far as culture is concerned, no easy recipe for action exists. It all depends on 
you’re your aims are. 
P – I am interested in the way you see culture as an ideological issue. When I visited 
the United States I was impressed by their museums. I was a bit shocked to find that 
they had appropriated cultural items from all over the world and put them in their 
museums, as if to say, we possess the world’s cultures, it is not by chance that we are 
who we are…
E – It is not by chance that we have the world’s cultures; we have them be-
cause we are who we are, right? Well the question is a difficult one. In the 
first place I would argue that each people should struggle for its own herit-
age. But the accumulation you mention is somewhat inevitable. If you think 
about dominant societies throughout history you will see that they system-
atically took over the cultural production of the groups they dominated. That 
was the source of the wealth of Babylonia, of Assyria, of Egypt, of Greece, 
of Rome, of the Holy Roman Empire, of the British Empire, of the United 
States. Those who have shall have more and there is no way of avoiding this 
problem. The only way is to have more yourself. The competition for power 
implies competition for resources. So I would argue that we should leave be-
hind moral indignation and enter the political arena, recognizing that those 
who have most power have more, right? Let us see if we can be a bit more 
powerful. There is no other solution. You might prefer that the United States 
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had never bought the works of art that they now show off in their museums. 
But what would you do? Would you develop a moral attitude of restriction? 
I think it is unreal to think in these terms. We have to protect our national 
heritage to avoid it being exported. But to imagine that it is possible to stop 
countries buying from other countries is a little simplistic.
The question of ideology is a complex issue. I am somewhat tied up in 
this having spent three years trying to write an article about how to distin-
guish between culture and ideology. To tell you the truth, I don’t really like 
ideology as a concept because it has two meanings with which it is difficult 
to work. It contains the notion that ideology is mystification. You can’t work 
with the concept of ideology without this idea creeping in, forcing us to be-
gin by distinguishing between what is being mystified and ewhat is not being 
mystified. As an anthropologist, I start from a different point of view. I prefer 
to use the term ideology in a wider sense, as a vision or project for ordering 
society as whole. When we talk of a liberal ideology or a socialist ideology the 
term makes sense. But for other ends, I prefer to use terms such as cultural 
relations, cultural policies or political aspects of cultural relations.
You went to the United States, right? Go to Mexico. There you will find 
is a constant utilization of popular culture and indigenous culture as a way 
of glorifying the State through the so-called Mexican Revolution. En passant 
one might observe that this is something of a hoax. The truth of the matter is 
that nation states are built on the cultural creation of a common heritage and 
a common identity. There is no other way to build a society. States do this to a 
great extent to benefit the dominant classes. You can’t get away from the fact 
that the states themselves operate in this way. Since nations are organized by 
states and since nations can only function through a common heritage (this 
is what expresses the idea of nation) this process is inevitable. I see no other 
way forward. We may say that we should act politically to make this process 
less exploitative, less violent and less likely to destroy existing cultural diver-
sity. This would be an ideological attitude, a political attitude I would defend. 
It is, I argue, a necessary cultural policy. Take the case of Brazilian history: a 
history of the dominant classes. This creates serious problems for the mem-
bers of the working class who have no access to this history. 
During recent research I have been interviewing members of segments 
of the working class, especially those living on the periphery of São Paulo, to 
see how they understand their relationship to the State. The complex way in 
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which this issue is thought through will not however result in a satisfactory 
political project because there is a lack of general information. When you 
talk to these people the State appears as so distant that any attempt to influ-
ence it would be impossible. Well this is not a false perception. It is correct 
because the State is indeed distant and there are no mechanisms available for 
influencing it. But people do not distinguish between the Legislative Power, 
the Executive Power and so on. It is important to understand why they do not 
have this information. This kind of knowledge is power. And members of the 
working class are only too aware of the importance of acquiring such knowl-
edge if they are to improve their living conditions by obtaining resources 
through and from the State. The notion of ideology is complex also because 
it is ubiquitous in the sense that it is always associated with specific interests 
and political projects. In fact everyone has an ideology. The concept only re-
ally works well when related to major projects for social organization. On the 
other hand, I do not see the possibility of organizing a society that is cultur-
ally totally segmented. This is not because it would be economically unviable, 
but because it would create unnecessary conflicts. I think that all should have 
access to all cultural goods and that all of them will be ideologically contami-
nated. This seems inevitable also. 
P – I understand that dominant groups were interested in preserving things that 
identified the dominant within the wider historical orocess. So one would think that 
a central interest of these groups would be to preserve what we call historical heri-
tage in order to strengthen their own identity. Yet in practice this does not happen. 
How do you see this question? 
E - We should look at the present moment. The Brazil we have today is a very 
recent Brazil, fundamentally post 1945. We must not forget that industrial-
ization brought about a major change in the composition of the dominant 
classes and their interests. Their interests are different, they are of distinct 
social origin and their histories are also different. And there are certain spe-
cificities in the Brazilian situation, which I find difficult to explain. In Brazil 
there is a fascination for all that is new. In other countries there is a greater 
interest in the past. This is not exclusive to the dominant classes. Everyone is 
enchanted by novelty. I still remember the introduction of louvered windows. 
It was madness. Everyone removed their venetian shutters to put in louvered 
windows. It was an immediate success. I remember also when it became 
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fashionable to paint walls in different colors. This was also a success in 
Brazil. It began among the dominant classes but five years later it reached the 
town in the hinterland where I came from. Soon every wall was in a different 
color. You would go into your friends’ houses and all the walls were different 
colors and the windows were all louvered; a total success.
I undertook my first research project in the hinterland of the states of 
Espírito Santo and Minas Gerais soon after the opening of the main road 
linking Rio de Janeiro to Salvador, Bahia. It amazed me to see the building 
of lots of little houses along the road, all built in “modern” style; the pop-
ular appropriation of what was called “modern”: with geometric designs 
on the façades, all in different colors. Impressive. The same applies to 
clothing fashions. 
I really can’t explain why this is the case in Brazil. People love all that is 
new. This is not the case in Mexico, so much so that I have the impression 
that this is because in Mexico the State was so active in promoting an interest 
in national heritage as a form of strengthening the state and building nation-
al identity.
P – Isn’t this the central issue? 
E – Now we identify ourselves through things that are new instead of things 
from the past. That is what is happening. 
P – But things that are new cannot constitute an identity because they are ephemer-
al. Is all that is new really new? I don’t know.
E – You’ve raised a very interesting problem. I have no ready explanation but 
it would be interesting to investigate this in relation to the cultural history 
of Brazil, which is not my specialty. But what I observe is that people identify 
themselves by their willingness to adopt novelty. If you are working with peo-
ple who have just arrived from the rural areas and compare your interviews 
with the opinions of others who have lived for a longer time in the towns, 
you will see how extraordinarily ready they are to accept change. I also think 
that this has not always been the case in Brazil, but it is a characteristic….
E – I would just like to mention one more little thing. I am not sure whether 
all this is new or whether it arrived on the last boat.
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P – This is old.
E – Yes, very old. I think it is a bit of both. In fact it is not just that which has 
arrived on the last boat but also something of the novelty produced here in 
Brazil. In the modern world the economy is internationalized and national 
cultures have to be looked at relatively. We should not think that each coun-
try will produce its own little culture. There is movement always in two di-
rections, at once of uniformization and of differentiation. I cannot present 
this as a general theory, but as something to be investigated in concrete cases.
And just to reply again to another question, I would like to insist that the 
dominant classes are not monolithic. They are diverse and open to criticism. 
Indeed the ability to elaborate a critical position is also an example of class 
privilege since critical faculties are also social constructed. Also, this is often 
associated with power struggles between distinct segments within the domi-
nant classes. And, finally, it is a powerful weapon in the hands of the intel-
lectuals as they struggle to move into a privileged position in this process. 
Criticism is this also.
Translated by Peter Fry
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